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RAPE LAW: THE NEED FOR REFORM
R. BRUCE WASHBURN

Being men, those who have made and compiled the laws have
favored their own sex, and jurists have elevated these laws into
principles.
Poulain de ]a Barre

In its 1975 session the New
198,1 commonly referred to
and thereby entirely changed
state.2 Under the new act,
"criminal sexual penetration,"

Mexico Legislature enacted Senate Bill
as the Criminal Sexual Conduct Act,
the concept of sexual crimes in this
the most heavily penalized crime is
defined as

a person unlawfully and intentionally causing another, other than his
spouse, to engage against his or her will in sexual intercourse,
cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse or causing any penetration,
to any extent and with any object, into the genital or anal openings
of another. 3

Whether the crime is punished as a first, second or third degree
felony depends in large part on the amount of physical or mental
harm caused to the victim.4 Some major differences from the old
statute s are immediately apparent. The previous statute only proscribed forced sexual intercourse, and not any of the other forced
deprivations of sexual choice included in the present statute.6 It also
*Member of the Bar, State of New Mexico.
1. Ch. 109, [1975] Laws of N.M.
2. The first New Mexico statute dealing with forcible rape was rather simple and straightforward compared to the present code provision. It stated that "... any person [who] shall
unlawfully have carnal knowledge of any woman by force and against her will..." would
be castrated, imprisoned up to ten years, or fined up to $1,000. Kearny Code of Laws, art.
II, § 2, 1 N.M. Stat. Ann. 86 (Repl. 1970). A few years later, in 1854, the Legislature
eliminated the punishment of castration, but excluded the "common prostitute" from the
protection of the statute. Ch. III, § 28, [1853-54] Laws of N.M. 94. Finally, in 1887, the
exclusion of the prostitute was ended, and most of the complexities of the crime of rape as
it existed prior to the 1975 revision were introduced, including the consent and resistance
standards. Ch. 24, § 1, [18871 Laws of N.M. 49.
3. Ch. 109, § 2, [19751 Laws of N.M.
4. Id. The gradations of the offense are also keyed to whether the victim is a child,
whether other persons are "aiders" or "abettors," and whether the crime occurs during the
commission of any other felony.
5. N.M. Stat. Ann., § 40A-9-2 (Supp. 1973).
6. When the word "rape" is used in this article, it refers only to forcible rape. The cases
discussed will include many which are both statutory and forcible rapes. When the facts
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provided the same punishment for the man who had intercourse with
a woman who was mentally incompetent, and thus incapable of
legally consenting, and the one who brutally beat his victim into
submission.7 Sodomy was absolutely proscribed, and the old Sexual
Offenses Act did not provide any harsher punishment for the homosexual rapist than for two consenting adults.' The new law takes by
far the more intelligent and less sexually biased approach to sexual
conduct and is a welcome reform. However, there is need for even
further change.
Although it appears from national9 and state' 0 statistics that a
constantly higher proportion of the female population reports being
raped, an indication that more rapes are occurring, it still has the
lowest conviction rate of any violent crime. 1' It also has the lowest
violent crime police clearance rate, which has decreased' 2 as the
number of reported rapes has increased, and an incredibly low rate
of being reported.' 3 These facts raise a serious question whether the
rules of law which courts apply in rape trials are well-suited to performing the task for which they are intended. In the course of this
article's review of such rules of law an attempt to evaluate their
effectiveness will be made.
When one asks what the purpose of forcible rape law is, some
answer that it is the protection of men's property interest in their
sexual partners.'" Although this response is given a great deal of
plausibility by the structure of the rape laws,' ' it is doubtlessly
proved show both kinds of rape, the defendant may be convicted of forcible rape. State v.
Garcia, 78 N.M. 136, 429 P.2d 334 (1967).
7. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-2 (Supp. 1973).
8. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-6 (2d Repl. 1972).
9. In 1959, the first year for which separate statistics were kept for forcible rape, there
were 8.3 rapes per 100,000 population. Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States 33 (1959) [hereinafter cited as UCR
(date)]. In 1970, the rate was 18.3, UCR 64 (1970), and by 1973 it had climbed to 24.3.
UCR 58 (1973). Since 1968, the forcible rape rate has increased 55%. Id. at 13.
10. In 1959 the forcible rape rate per 100,000 population in New Mexico was 8.6. UCR
46 (1959). In 1970 it was 21.7. UCR 78 (1970). And in 1973 it was 32.1. UCR 72 (1973).
11. UCR 35 (1973). These statistics are based only on reported rapes which the police
determine are actual offenses, about 85% of those reported. Id. at 15.
12. In 1959 the clearance rate for forcible rape was 73.6%. UCR 11 (1959). By 1973 it
had dropped to 51%, by far the lowest for violent crimes. UCR 29 (1973).
13. See UCR 15 (1973); Institute for Social Research and Development, 83 Division of
Government Research Review 1 (1975); Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society
and Law, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 919, 921-22 (1973).
14. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 13, at 924-25; Comment, The Resistance Standardin
Rape Legislation, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 680, 684 (1966); Comment, Forcible and Statutory
Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 Yale
L.J. 55, 72 (1952). See also M. Amir, Patterns in Forcible Rape 25 (1971); Davis, Jealousy
and Sexual Property, 14 Social Forces 345 (1936).
15. That rape laws are not designed to protect the choice of sexual partner is seen from
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more useful to study such laws from the perspective of whether they
accomplish what should be their purpose, the protection of the
integrity of all persons' sexual choice. The present evidentiary rules
make the rape trial such a degrading experience for the victim that
many women do not report rapes or do not follow through on the
prosecutions. The rules also permit the defendant to introduce
essentially irrelevant but highly prejudicial matter into the case,
thereby avoiding conviction, not because he is innocent, but because
the jury thinks the victim is "guilty." Thus it is very appropriate to
ask whether the present rape trial rules strike a proper balance between the need to protect the innocent defendant from being convicted and society's need to identify and convict the rapist.
This article will deal with two areas of the law which the new act

did not change, though it attempted to. These areas are the corroboration requirement' sA and the use of evidence of an alleged rape
victim's prior consensual sexual conduct to prove that she consented
to having intercourse." 'B A third area of the law which will be
discussed is the resistance requirement. Under the old statute,
resistance on the part of the victim was the sine qua non of rape: it
either had to be present or there had to be a legally acceptable reason
the fact that usually the law only penalizes nonconsensual penetration of a vagina by a
penis. It has always been conceptually possible for men to "rape" men, or for women to
have intercourse with men who are not mentally capable of forming the intent to consent,
or for people to have forcible sexual relations other than intercourse. But none of these
deprivations of sexual choice has traditionally been criminalized. The fact that a married
woman could not be raped by her husband also indicates the idea of sexual property,
especially since they had to be legally separated, not just living apart, before the woman was
given any choice in the matter. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-1(B)(1), -2 (2d Repl. 1972).
The fact that, prior to 1973, it was only a crime to have intercourse with a female under
the age of consent, and not a male, also indicates that the law was meant to preserve women
as sexual property. See Comment, supra note 13, at 925. If deterring the corruption of
youth or the spread of disease had been the object of the statute, young males would also
have been protected. One could argue that a woman's being forced to have intercourse is
different from all other deprivations of sexual choice because it alone can result in pregnancy. However, emission, sterility, and contraception are not taken into account in determining whether an offense has been committed or what its punishment should be. Also, if
the lawmakers were so concerned about pregnancy resulting from rape, it is not likely they
would have waited until 1969 to legalize abortions after rapes. See ch. 67, § § 1, 3, [19691
Laws of N.M. 226 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 40A-5-1, -3 (2d Repl. 1972)). And
protecting against pregnancy does not explain why men were allowed to force their
estranged wives to have intercourse.
Outside of rape law, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-2-4 (2d repl. 1972), repealed in 1973, ch.
241, § 6, [1973] Laws of N.M. 943, made it a complete defense to a murder charge against a
man that the victim was having sexual intercourse with his wife, but no such protection was
provided for the wife. However, a woman may kill an attacker to protect her chastity. State
v. Martinez, 30 N.M. 178, 187-88, 230 P. 379, 383 (1924).
1SA. Ch. 109, § 6, [1975 Laws of N.M.
15B. Id. § 7.
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for its absence.' 6 In the new act, "resistance" is never mentioned,
but some concern has been expressed by supporters of the new
legislation that the courts may read the resistance requirement back
into the statute as an evidentiary standard.' 7 This article will show
why the courts should not undo what the Legislature has accomplished by removing the resistance requirement from the definition
of criminal sexual conduct.
RESISTANCE
One would think that, if a man causes a woman to have intercourse without her consent, that should be a sufficient occasion for
the invoking of criminal sanctions. But in New Mexico the previous
statute and case law required that at least one of four other circumstances occur. The victim had to be (1) unconscious or otherwise
physically incapable of resisting (not physically incapable of communicating a lack of consent, which is a different question); (2)
under a mental disability; (3) drugged without her own acquiesence;
or (4) forcibly overcome in her resistance. 1 8 Thus, resistance on the
victim's part was the focal point of rape law.
New Mexico's courts have slowly come to realize that the presence
of resistance was irrelevant to the question whether a woman had
been forced to have sexual intercourse. At one time the state was
required to prove that the woman had resisted to her utmost, regardless of the circumstances. In Mares v. Territory,' 9 when asked if she
had made any resistance, the victim testified that she had not, but
went on to say she had pushed her attacker back and "would kick at
him, and done what best I could to defend myself." 2 The Court
held that there was "an absolute lack of testimony . . . tending in the
least degree to show any resistance on the part of the prosecutrix." 2
It is not sufficient that the carnal act be violently accomplished,
or that it be without her consent. . . ."In such cases, although the
woman never said 'yes,' nay, more, although she constantly said 'no,'
and kept up a decent show of resistance to the last, it may still be
that she more than half consented to the ravishment." 2 2
16.
17.
Santa
18.
19.

See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-2 (Supp. 1973).
Interview with Ms. Jo Ann Carver, Assistant District Attorney, 2d Judicial District, in
Fe, N.M., Feb. 28, 1975.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-2(A)-(D) (2d Repl. 1972).
10 N.M. 770, 65 P. 165 (1901).

20. Id. at 775, 65 P. at 166.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 776, 65 P. at 166-67, citing People v. Hulse, 3 Hill 309.
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The Mares case, which apparently required a woman's utmost
resistance, rather than just a "decent show," set the standard for
resistance for many years.
The question of resistance was not addressed again by a New
Mexico appellate court for over 60 years, and it is impossible to
know how much injustice was caused by this embodiment of the
myth that a woman who says "no" means "yes" unless she physically resists to the full extent of her power.2 Finally, in State v.
Ramirez, 2 1 the New Mexico Supreme Court again considered the
issue of resistance. The defendant claimed that, because the victim's
toreador pants were not torn and her "private parts" were not injured, there was not substantial evidence of resistance. 2 s The Court
said that, although the evidence of resistance was "not particularly
strong," the fact that she had bruises, a cut lip, and a fractured nose
was sufficient to take the case to the jury,
particularly inasmuch as the physical violence done to the pros-

ecutrix and her resultant injuries therefrom tend to show that
further resistance would have been of no avail and perhaps would
have resulted in more serious injury to her.2 6

Having recognized that the utmost resistance requirement was
unrealistic in light of the danger to the victim from resisting in some
cases, the Court, five years later, announced a new standard. State v.
White 2 7 held that the amount of resistance required by the rape
statute depended on the circumstances of each case. 2 s Thus, the
White decision recognized a fact that has been substantiated by a
recent study,2 9 that rape victims often prefer submission to the risk
of being brutalized or murdered.
Even though the resistance requirement had been made more
realistic by the courts, it is not hard to understand why the Legislature thought there should be no such requirement at all in the new
act.3 0 There are really only two conceivable rationalizations for such
a requirement. Its purpose must either be evidentiary, 3' or to assure
23. One can safely assume that, if defendants were being convicted on a lesser standard
for resistance than that of Mares, some appellate review would have been sought.
24. 70 N.M. 54, 369 P.2d 973 (1962).
25. Id. at 55, 369 P.2d at 974.
26. Id. at 55-56, 369 P.2d at 974-75.
27. 77 N.M. 488, 424 P.2d 402 (1967).
28. Id. at 494-95, 424 P.2d at 406.
29. Amir, supra note 14, at 166-67.
30. Under the old resistance standard a woman who chose not to resist, knowing that
any such action increased her chances of being injured or killed, was not raped within the
meaning of the statute. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-2 (2d Repl. 1972).
31. See The Resistance Standard, supra note 14, at 682.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 5

that the man knows the woman is not consenting. However, it is
almost impossible to see the value of the evidentiary function (i.e.,
evidence of resistance is evidence of non-consent), because it is
legally possible to have a rape without physical resistance if such
3
resistance is prevented by threats or fear, " and apparently many
3
As for the idea that
rapes occur without the victim's resisting.
knows there is no
man
the
resistance is necessary to assure that
consent, it is difficult to see why a woman should be required to
physically resist when a verbal refusal can be just as effective. The
woman should not be punished because the man believes the myth
that when a woman says "no" she really means "yes." And the
woman is definitely punished by the requirement of resistance. In a
recent study of rape in Philadelphia it was found that in 93 percent
of the cases where force was not used on the victim, she had been
submissive, and that the amount of brutality used was directly
related to the resistance of the victim. " Hopefully, then, the courts
will not ignore the decision of the Legislature to eliminate the resistance requirement from rape law in New Mexico.
CHANGING THE EVIDENTIARY RULES-A LEGISLATIVE OR A
JUDICIAL FUNCTION?
Article III of the New Mexico Constitution requires the powers of
government to be apportioned to three distinct departments, the
legislative, the executive, and the judicial, and prohibits persons
charged with exercising the powers of one branch from exercising
any powers properly belonging to either of the others. In the Criminal Sexual Conduct Act the Legislature purports to eliminate any
3
requirement that a victim's testimony be corroborated, 1 and
excludes some evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct and
reputation. 3 6 Both sections attempt to change the rules of evidence
State v. White, 77 N.M. 488, 495, 424 P.2d 402, 406 (1967).
See Amir, supra note 14, at 166-67.
Amir, supra note 14, at 169, 171.
Ch. 109, § 6, [1975] Laws of N.M., reads in pertinent part as follows:
The testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under
Sections 2 through 5 of this act and such testimony shall be entitled to the
same weight as the testimony of victims of other crimes under the Criminal
Code.
36. Id. § 7. In this section the Legislature attempts to avoid separation-of-powers questions by stating:
A. As a matter of substantive right, in prosecutions under Sections 2 through
6 of this act, evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct, opinion evidence
thereof, or of reputation for past sexual conduct, shall not be admitted unless,
and only to the extent that the court finds, that evidence of the victim's past
32.
33.
34.
35.
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and standards of judicial review in New Mexico, 3' 7 and in so doing
raise the question whether altering such rules is a legislative or a
judicial function. If it is a judicial function, then any rules promulgated by the Legislature which conflict with those of the courts
would not be effective and would not change the law.3 8 The
Supreme Court of New Mexico has, through case law, and through
adoption of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence, already acted in the
areas where the Legislature has attempted to change the law.' 9
Therefore, if it is within the courts' power to formulate evidentiary
rules such as these, they remain the law.4 0
Although the question which branch has the power to formulate
rules of evidence has never been specifically decided in New Mexico,
it is apparent that the task belongs to the courts.4 The Supreme
sexual conduct is material to the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial
nature does not outweigh its probative value.
Part B provides for an in camera hearing on motion of the defendant if he desires to
introduce such evidence. After the hearing the court is to issue a written order stating what
evidence may be introduced and what specific questions are permitted.
37. The evidentiary nature of the limitations on admitting evidence of prior sexual
conduct is obvious. The corroboration requirement is also an evidentiary rule in that the
courts have used it to determine whether there was substantial evidence presented at trial,
sufficient to support the jury verdict. See notes 6 2-64 infra and accompanying text.
38. Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. 107, 108, 542 P.2d 176, 176-77
(1969).
39. See notes 56-77, 86-96, infra, and accompanying text.
40. State ex ret Delgado v. Stanley, 83 N.M. 626, 627, 495 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1972);
State ex rel. Peters v. McIntosh, 80 N.M. 496, 498, 458 P.2d 222, 224 (1969); Southwest
Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. 107, 108, 452 P.2d 176, 176-77 (1969).
41. There are some cases which indicate that evidentiary rules are a judicial function.
Zeckendorf v. Hutchinson, 1 N.M. 476 (1871), upheld a demurrer to a petition for an
injunction to keep the respondents from removing ore from a mining claim. The plaintiffs
offered a "certificate of location," saying it was conclusive proof, under the statutes, that
there had been compliance with the requirements of the law for perfecting title. The Court
stated, "It is not in the power of the legislature, under our form of government, to make it
conclusive as to matters which are essential to the performance of any statutory provision."
Id. at 479. Although this case indicates that the Legislature cannot dictate the form or
sufficiency of proof to the Court on a question it is to decide, it is doubtful whether its
somewhat ambiguous holding, never again cited as authority by any court, can be considered dispositive of the issue, or even persuasive.
In a more recent case, Heron v. Gaylor, 53 N.M. 44, 201 P.2d 366 (1948), the Court was
considering whether changing the manner in which cases were set for hearing was considered
"procedure" within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition of
the Legislature's
changing the rules of evidence or procedure in any pending case. N.M. Const. art. IV, § 34.
In holding that such a change was not procedural, the court in dicta adopted the following
definition:
The term procedure is so broad in its significance that it is seldom employed in
our books as a term of art. It includes in its meaning whatever is embraced by
the three technical terms pleading, evidence, and practice. 53 N.M. at 49, 201
P.2d at 369.
One might be tempted to construe the Constitution as impliedly granting to the Legislature the power to promulgate rules of evidence by virtue of the fact that the article IV
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Court has held that, under the New Mexico Constitution, the Legislature has the power to declare the substantive law, but only the
Supreme Court can promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and
procedure. 4 2 Although it is not always possible to clearly define the
4
the substantive law is that
distinction between the two areas,
'
' whereas the courts
obligations,"
and
which "creates duties, rights,
the administra"facilitate
which
matters
over
power
have exclusive
'4
in Sibbach v.
Court
Supreme
States
United
The
tion of justice."
4
procedure
regulates
rule
a
whether
for
test
the
stated
6
Wilson & Co.
rights and
enforcing
for
process
judicial
"the
to be whether it affects
administering
justly
for
and
law
substantive
by
duties recognized
'4
An example of this
remedy and redress for disregard of them."
in which the New
Co.,"
Ditch
Sunset
v.
State
in
found
is
distinction
reserve the right
can
Legislature
the
that
held
Court
Mexico Supreme
only a court
but
non-user,
or
misuser
for
a
corporation
to dissolve
has ocnon-use
or
misuse
such
whether
can finally determine
4
rights
what
determine
to
is
Legislature
the
words,
In other
curred.
rights
those
whether
determine
to
are
courts
the
people have, but
of
adjunct
clear
a
be
to
seem
would
it
and
have been transgressed,
such
which
in
way
the
determine
to
courts
this function for the
transgressions are to be proved. It cannot be doubted that it is a part
of the judicial function to determine the relevancy and materiality of
evidence and whether the evidence presented is sufficient to prove
the facts in issue, as that is what courts must do in adjudicating
cases." o Since rules of evidence and standards of review are actually
just a structuring of the kinds of decisions which judges must make
daily, and which they have always made in this state with little or no
prohibition against changing such rules applies only to pending suits. But this possibility has
been considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya,
80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176 (1969). There the Court points out that article IV only allows
one branch to exercise the powers of another branch when the Constitution expressly
directs or permits it. "Thus, the Constitution itself, in plain, unambiguous and explicit
language, forbids a construction of the Constitution which would authorize the exercise of
such a power by implied authority." Id. at 109, 452 P.2d at 178.
42. Southwest Underwriters v. Montoya, 80 N.M. 107, 108-09, 452 P.2d 176, 177-78
(1969).
43. Id. at 109, 452 P.2d at 178.
44. Johnson v. Terry, 48 N.M. 255, 258, 149 P.2d 295, 297 (1944).
45. State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 420 60 P.2d 646, 660 (1936).
46. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
47. Id. at 14.
48. N.M. 17, 145 P.2d 219 (1944).
49. Id. at 29, 145 P.2d at 226.
50. Cf Tapia v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Co., 78 N.M. 86, 89, 428 P.2d 623, 626
(1967); Glass v. Stratofles, Inc., 76 N.M. 595, 599, 417 P.2d 201, 204 (1966).
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guidance from the Legislature, it seems somewhat amiss to assert
their formulation to be really a legislative and not a judicial function.
Support for this conclusion is provided by a number of sources.
Probably the strongest indicator of what the New Mexico Supreme
Court will hold when the question is presented is its order of April
26, 1973,11 adopting the rules of evidence. If the Court did not
believe it had the power to adopt those rules, it presumably would
not have done so.
Other courts" 2 and a number of commentators5 3 have also concluded that evidentiary rules are part of the "practice, pleading and
procedure" which the courts have the power to regulate. Foremost
among the courts accepting this proposition is the United States
Supreme Court, which, pursuant to its power "to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and
the practice and procedure of the district courts," ' ' adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence.5 I In light of the present weight of

authority, and the attitude towards its rule-making power which the
present New Mexico Supreme Court has already shown, it appears
51. 84 N.M. xii (1973).
52. Monarch Ins. Co. v. Sprach, 281 F.2d 401, 409 (5th Cir. 1960); Kellman v. Stoltz, 1
F.R.D. 726, 728 (N.D. Iowa 1941); Ogdon v. Giankos, 415 11. 591, 596, 114 N.E.2d 686,
689 (1953); Jones v. Garnett, 192 Kan. 109, 114, 386 P.2d 194, 198 (1963); People v.
Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 336, 217 N.W.2d 22, 26 (1974); Perin v. Peuler, 373 Mich. 531,
541, 130 N.W.2d 4, 9 (1964); Sackheirn v. Pigueron, 215 N.Y. 62, 73, 109 N.E. 109, 111
(1915); Jones v. Erie R.R. Co., 106 Ohio St. 408,413, 140 N.E. 366, 367 (1922); Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 559, 307 A.2d 255, 260 (1973) (semble); Dyer v. Keefe, 97
R.I. 418, 422-23, 198 A.2d 159, 161 (1974); Kins v. Schumacher, 32 Cal. App.2d 172,
181-82, 89 P.2d 466, 472 (1939); Geddes & Moss Undertaking & Embalming Co. v. First
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 177 So. 818, 821 (La. Ct. App.), aff'd, 189 La. 891, 181 So. 436 (1938);
City of Kirksville v. Munyon, 114 Mo. App. 567, 570, 91 S.W. 57, 58 (1905); State ex rel.
Sims v. Caruthers, I Okla. Crim. 428, 439, 98 P. 474, 479 (1908); Brooks v. Texas Emp.
Ins. Ass'n, 358 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
53. Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate Procedure, 49 Harv.
L. Rev. 1302, 1311 (1936); Degnan, The Feasibilityof Rules of Evidence in FederalCourts,
24 F.R.D. 341, 345 (1960); Green, Preliminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibilityof
Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 30 F.R.D. 79, 104-05
(1961); Grinnell, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power PrescribeRules
of Evidence? 24 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 41, 42 (1940); Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and
Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 623, 651 (1957); Morgan,
Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural? 10 Vand. L. Rev. 467, 484 (1957); Congressional Discretion in Dealing with the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 U. Mich. J.L. Reform
798, 804-05 (1973); Recent Developments, Evidence-Congressional Preemption of the
FederalRules of Evidence, 49 Wash. L. Rev. 1184, 1190 (1974).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
55. 56 F.R.D. 184 (1972). Congress postponed by statute, however, the effective date of
those rules until it had had an opportunity to make its own study. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071
(Supp. 1973). Eventually Congress enacted its own version of the rules. Pub. L. No. 93-595,
88 Stat. 1926, 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2215.
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almost certain that only the Supreme Court can change the rules of
evidence.
CORROBORATION

Appellate courts display a great deal of anxiety in reviewing rape
convictions. Courts will look, not only for errors of law, but also for
sufficient evidence to satisfy themselves of the defendant's guilt.' 6
The anxiety arises from the belief that rape charges are hard to
defend against and that trial judges and juries are likely to be in5 7
Usually, the only subfluenced by the heinousness of the crime.

stantiation for these beliefs comes from citing other rape cases where
appellate courts have reversed the usual review process and substi5
tuted their judgment for that of the factfinder at trial. 8 In fact,

what little evidence we have indicates that juries are very willing to
acquit accused rapists.' 9 But nevertheless, the courts have fashioned
special rules of review 6 0 which apply only to rape cases, and which
essentially give the defendant the chance to have his case retried on
appeal.

The major tool of the reviewing courts is the requirement that the
6
accusation of the victim be corroborated by independent sources. '
56. Cf State v. Taylor, 32 N.M. 163, 167, 252 P. 984, 985 (1927) (statutory rape
conviction).
57. See State v. Shults, 43 N.M. 71, 77, 85 P.2d 591, 594-95 (1938).
58. See id. at 77, 85 P.2d at 594.
59. H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 249-54 (1966). See also 7 J. Wigmore, A
Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2061, at
354 (1940) (hereinafter cited as Wigmore].
60. Another result of the courts' fear that rape complaints will dislodge the reason of
juries is the requirement that, when there is an uncorroborated accusation, it is error to
refuse a tendered instruction advising the jury that the heinous nature of the crime might
prejudice them against the defendant, and that such charges are easy to make and hard to
defend against, so they should not give undue weight to the victim's uncorroborated testimony. State v. Dodson, 67 N.M. 146, 147-48, 353 P.2d 364, 365-66 (1960); State v.
Clevenger, 27 N.M. 466, 469-70, 202 P. 687, 689-90 (1921).
61. The early development of the corroboration requirement in New Mexico is reviewed
in State v. Shults, 43 N.M. 71, 74-78, 85 P.2d 591, 592-95 (1938).
An adjunct to the corroboration requirement is the "inherent improbability" standard
used by appellate courts in testing the evidence in sex crime cases. This standard does not
merit extensive discussion here because it is primarily used in statutory rape cases (see, e.g.,
State v. Till, 78 N.M. 255, 430 P.2d 752 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 713 (1968); State v.
Salazar, 74 N.M. 63, 390 P.2d 653 (1964); and State v. Montoya, 62 N.M. 173, 306 P.2d
1095 (1957)) where corroboration is not required. State v. Montoya, supra, at 175, 306
P.2d at 1097. Additionally, it is a lesser standard than that of corroboration. See id. But it
can still be used by appellate courts to justify substituting their judgment for that of the
jury.
In reviewing rape evidence on appeal, the court will give it a careful examination to
determine not only whether it is substantial, but also to assure itself that the defendant is
guilty. State v. Shults, 43 N.M. 71, 74, 85 P.2d 591, 592 (1938). If the victim's testimony is
inherently improbable, then there cannot be a conviction, in the absence of some evidence
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In State v. Ellison6 2 the court stated that a rape defendant could be
convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim,6 3 but
went on to establish what is still essentially the standard for corroboration in New Mexico:
It is of course true, that in a sense, the testimony of a prosecutrix
must be corroborated. That is, it must bring together a number of
surrounding facts and circumstances which coincide with and tend
to establish the truth of her testimony. Without such surrounding
facts and circumstances, the bald statement and charge of a woman
against a man would be so devoid of testimonial value as to render it
unworthy of belief, and to cause it to fail to meet the requirements
of the law, namely, evidence of a substantial character. 6 4

Thus, the kind of corroboration required in New Mexico assumes
that, if a rape occurred, there will be some evidence of it other than
the victim's testimony. However, an examination of the source of the
idea that corroborating circumstances, such as outcries, signs of a
struggle, or an immediate complaint, 6 I will ordinarily occur in rape
cases points up the questionable validity of the requirement. Many
rapes occur without the victim resisting physically, 6 6 so signs of a
struggle will be absent in many cases. In Mares v. Territory, the Court
explained why the absence of an outcry on the part of the victim
during the rape is "a circumstance which cannot be overlooked." ' 6 1
The victim claimed that she did not cry out because there was no one
around to help her. 6 8 The Court rejected this explanation, stating:
An outcry in such circumstances, if the prosecutrix were an
unwilling participant, . . . would have been the involuntary scream
unequivocally and unerringly pointing to the defendant's guilt. State v. Salazar, supra, at 64,
390 P.2d at 654. At one time "inherent improbability" would be found if the appellate
court felt that what the complaining witness alleged was possible but was "at variance with
human experience." State v. Clevenger, 27 N.M. 466, 470, 202 P. 687, 688 (1921)
(Clevenger contains language concerning both corroboration and inherent improbability, but
has recently been described as an inherent improbability case in State v. Carillo, 82 N.M.
257, 261, 479 P.2d 537, 541 (Ct. App. 1970)). Since the Clevenger case the rule has
changed. In State v. Boyd, 84 N.M. 290, 502 P.2d 315, (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M.
271, 502 P.2d 296 (1972), the Court stated that testimony is not inherently improbable
unless what is claimed to have occurred could not in fact have happened. Id. at 291, 502
P.2d at 317.
62. 19 N.M. 428, 144 P. 10 (1914).
63. 19 N.M. at 447, 144 P. at 16.
64. Id. at 449, 144 P. at 17. Only the fact that complaint was made, and not the details
of the complaint, are admissible. State v. Shults, 43 N.M. 71, 78, 85 P.2d 591, 595 (1939);
Territory v. Maldonado, 9 N.M. 629, 635, 58 P. 350, 351 (1899).
65. See State v. Shults, 43 N.M. 71, 75, 85 P.2d 591, 593-94 (1938).
66. See notes 18-34 supra, and accompanying text.
67. 10 N.M. 770, 774, 65 P. 165, 166 (1901).
68. Id. at 775, 65 P. at 166.

NEW MEXICO LA WREVIEW

1290

[Vol. 5

for assistance in impending danger. The outcry is not the result of
consideration or deliberative thought. It is always impetuous, and in
the feminine nature it is natural and immediate. . . . Surprise never

paralyzes 6the feminine tendency to scream when danger seems
imminent.

9

Since the Mares case, courts have become a little less confident of
their knowledge of the "feminine nature," and have recognized that
an outcry will not necessarily be forthcoming when 7there is no one
to hear it, or when it would endanger the victim's life. "
the victim of rape is
In addition to signs of force or an outcry,
7 In State v. Ellison,7 2 a
expected to make an immediate complaint.
statutory rape case, the Court explained why evidence of the complaint is admissible as corroborative of a claim of rape:
The principle upon which these complaints are to be admitted is
that no self-respecting woman, after an outrage of this kind, can
refrain from proclaiming the same to some friend, and from seeking
aid and comfort as the circumstances will admit of. If she remains
silent, except in exceptional circumstances,7 3the inference is strong
committed.
that the outrage was not in fact

The "exceptional circumstances" mentioned by the Ellison court
have been found to be not so exceptional, a delayed report of the

crime occurring in up to 42 percent of the cases in one recent
study. 7 4 The New Mexico courts have recognized this fact by upholding convictions when a complaint was not going to be made, but
a neighbor insisted, after finding the victim hemorrhaging, when

76
and when the
complaint was delayed due to hysteria and shock,
was still
attacker
her
while
victim was afraid to complain to strangers

present. 7
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., State v. Foley, 55 N.M. 590, 599, 237 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1951).
error
71. In Territory v. Pino, 9 N.M. 598, 58 P. 393 (1899), it was held to be prejudicial
to
victim
the
of
failure
the
that
jury
the
to
out
pointing
instruction
to refuse a tendered
make an immediate complaint of the rape reflected on her credibility. Id. at 602-03, 58 P. at
394-95.
72. 19 N.M. 428, 144 P. 10 (1914).
73. Id. at 437, 144 P. at 13.
74. Amir, supra note 14, at 290.
75. State v. Foley, 55 N.M. 590, 597, 600-01, 237 P.2d 1033, 1037, 1040 (1951).
76. State v. White, 77 N.M. 488, 495, 424 P.2d 402, 406 (1967).
77. State v. Sanders, 54 N.M. 369, 374, 225 P.2d 150, 153-54 (1950). In a statutory rape
intercase, the Court affirmed a conviction when the victim did not complain of forced
it before
course until after it was discovered she was pregnant. She said she had not reported
the
because of a threat from the defendant and because she was too ashamed. Although
"inherently
being
story's
her
prevented
explanation
her
corroboration,
not
was
complaint
See
improbable." State v. Montoya, 62 N.M. 173, 175-76, 306 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1957).
note 61, supra.
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Even though the courts have recognized that there can be valid

reasons for the absence of the usually expected corroborating evidence, it has been held as recently as 1970 that a man cannot be
convicted of rape on the uncorroborated testimony of a woman. 78
The courts are apparently unwilling to give up the belief that rape
trials, preceded by police and prosecutorial screening, are less likely

than other criminal trials to determine which accusations are true
and which are false. Since corroboration is not required in statutory
rape cases because the courts do not wish to expose children to the
dangers of sexual assault by requiring corroboration where it may

not be present,7

9

it would seem that the requirement should be

dropped for forcible rape cases when one realizes that the expected
corroboration will similarly not be present in many legitimate rape

incidents.
It is also questionable whether the corroboration requirement can
be applied so that it assists in acquitting innocent men. The State of
New York's difficulties with the corroboration requirement illustrate
the problems it can create. Prior to 1972, the New York Legislature
required by statute that there be corroborating evidence of penetration, of lack of consent, and of the attacker's identity.8 0 However,
this requirement was so onerous, it became virtually impossible to
secure convictions for rape,' 1 and the legislators finally had to revise

it. 2 Whether the revision will make a significant difference remains
to be seen, but the fact that corroboration of each of the contested
elements of the crime had to be eliminated points to the real problem. In order to really serve its purpose of assuring that innocent

men are not convicted, it would seem that the requirement would
have to be so strenuous that the law would lose its deterrent effect,
and would become useless as a means of identifying those men who
78. State v. Turner, 81 N.M. 571, 577, 469 P.2d 720, 726 (Ct. App. 1970).
79. State v. Trujillo, 60 N.M. 277, 283, 285, 291 P.2d 315, 319, 320 (1955).
80. See ch. 1030, [1965] Laws of N.Y.; Note, CorroboratingCharges of Rape, 61
Colum. L. Rev. 1137, 1139 (1967), and authorities cited therein.
81. Pitler, "Existentialism" and Corroboration of Sex Crimes in New York: A New
Attempt to Limit "If Someone Didn't See It, It Didn't Happen, " 24 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 1-6
(1973); Lear, Q. If You Rape a Woman and Steal Her TV, What Can They Get You For in
New York?A. Stealing Her TV, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972, § 6 (Magazine) at 11, 55.
82. Ch. 373, 119721 Laws of N.Y., codified at N.Y. Penal Law § 130.15(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1972). The 1972 law required only that the testimony of the alleged victim be
supported by evidence tending to establish that an attempt was made to engage in sexual
conduct at the time of the occurrence, and that there was a lack of consent.
In 1974 this section was amended again to eliminate the corroboration requirement
except in cases of consensual sodomy or where the alleged victim is under 17, mentally
defective, or mentally incapacitated. Ch. 14, § 1 [19741 Laws of N.Y., codified at N.Y.
Penal Law § 130.16 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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are in need of treatment to prevent their engaging in further criminal
sexual behavior. 8
In order to avoid convicting an innocent man, the proof of two
separate facts which can be very difficult to corroborate is required.
There must be evidence of penetration, but when there is no emission, that may be difficult to obtain. Also, there must be proof of a
lack of consent, but, if there is no struggle and no non-participant
witness, corroboration may be impossible. If both of these facts must
be corroborated, the enforcement of the law breaks down, as shown
by the New York experience. 8 4 But if only general corroboration is
required, as in New Mexico, there is very little relationship between
when corroboration will be present, and when rape will have
occurred. Signs of a horrendous struggle, providing perfect corroboration for lack of consent, are not at all probative of penetration. And
conclusive evidence of penetration has no probative value on the
issue of consent. Thus, a general corroboration requirement really
only favors the clever or fortuitous rapist, and not the innocent
accused. It is probable that the dilemma inherent in the corroboration requirement, that it must either free rapists or not offer any real
protection to the innocent, explains why all but a handful of states
have done away with it. 8 I The New Mexico courts should follow the
Legislature, lay the corroboration requirement to rest, and rely on
the ability of judges, juries, and reviewing courts to protect the
innocent.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE

Much recent criticism of rape laws and their implementation has
centered on the fact that the victim's past sexual activities may be
inquired into at trial, thus making her sexual history a matter of
public record, and it is believed that this rule of evidence is responsible for much of the failure to report and prosecute rapes by the
victims. 8 6 Prior to the adoption of the New Mexico Rules of Evi83. Actually, this latter purpose of the law need not be stressed, as only a handful of
states presently have rehabilitation programs for sexual deviates in their penal programs,
even though those that do seem to be having some success at ending criminal sexual behavior. See 1 Corrections Magazine 22, 56 (1974).
84. Cf People v. Radunovic, 21 N.Y.2d 186, 191, 234 N.E.2d 212, 215, 287 N.Y.S.2d
33, 36 (1967) (Breitel, J. concurring).
85. See Note, The Rape CorroborationRequirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 Yale L. J.
1365, 1367-68 (1972).
86. See, e.g., Institute for Social Research and Development, 83 Division of Government
Research Review 3 (1975); Michigan Women's Task Force on Rape, Background Material
for a Proposal for Criminal Code Reform to Respond to Michigan's Rape Crisis 3; Comment,
supra note 13, at 935.
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dence,' " such evidence was admissible on two grounds. First, it was
considered relevant and admissible on the issue whether the
prosecuting witness had consented to intercourse.' 8 And even when
consent was not in issue, it had also been allowed for purposes of
impeaching the credibility of the victim in her capacity as a witness.8 Rule 608' 0 eliminates admissibility under the latter rationale
by limiting attacks on credibility to reputation or opinion evidence
which refers to the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. 9 ' Obviously, evidence concerning a witness's chastity, or lack
thereof, is not admissible under this rule. However, the rules did not
significantly change the law regarding admissibility of evidence on
the victim's sexual character for purposes of showing consent. Rule
404 states:
(a) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY. Evidence of a
person's character or trait of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
/"(2) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to
rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor .... 9'

Even though there are no reported cases construing this rule from
the states which have adopted it,9 3 it can hardly be questioned that
it is intended to permit the admission of evidence of the sexual
character of a rape victim when consent is in issue. The Advisory
Committee's note to the Federal Rule 404, from which the New
Mexico rule was taken verbatim, states that the usual rule permitting
the admission of such evidence was incorporated in the federal
rule. 9' In addition, the "pertinency" of such evidence had been
87. Order of Court, 84 N.M. XII (1973); N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 20-4-101 through 1102
(Supp. 1973) (effective July 1, 1973).
88. State v. Ulmer, 37 N.M. 222, 224, 20 P.2d 934, 936 (1933) (dictum).
89. State v. McKinzie, 72 N.M. 23, 24, 380 P.2d 177, 178 (1963) (permissible in
prosecution for indecent exposure before a minor to cross-examine victim as witness on
indecent acts).
90. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-608 (Supp. 1973).
91. This limitation is subject to an exception, not relevant here, for convictions for
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-609 (Supp.

1973).

92. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4404 (Supp. 1973).
93. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 48.045 (1973); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 904.04 (Pamphlet Supp. 40L

1974).

94. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 220

(1972).
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including New
widely accepted throughout the United States,
9
Mexico. 6
As can be seen from the rule quoted above, the admissibility of a

rape victim's sexual character is one of the few exceptions to the
usual rule that a person's character may not be proved to show that
she acted in conformance with that character on the occasion in
question.9 Since the wisdom of this exception has been called into
question, its rationale should be examined to determine whether
New Mexico should retain it or discard it, as has occurred, in whole

or in part, in other states. 9 8

A. Rationalefor the Rule on Admissibility

Wigmore states that our evidentiary system rests upon two axioms.
The first is that "none but facts having rational probative value are

admissible." 9 9 The second is that "all facts having rational probative
values are admissible, unless some specific rule forbids."' 0 0 These
axioms find expression in Rule 402 of the New Mexico Rules of
Evidence,' 0 and can be taken as the standard by which we should
determine the admissibility of evidence of a victim's past sexual
conduct in a rape case. Thus, two questions are presented. Is the
evidence in question relevant to any issue in the case, particularly the
issue of the victim's consent?" If it is relevant, should it be excluded

for some other reason?
evidence
"Relevant evidence" is defined by the rules as "...
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."'

02

After

95. 1 Wigmore § 62. Even the most recent supplement to this volume fails to list one
case where such evidence was excluded on the grounds that it was not relevant to the issue
of consent.
96. State v. Ulmer, 37 N.M. 222, 224, 20 P.2d 934, 936 (1933) (dictum).
97. See authorities cited in note 86 supra.
98. Michigan has totally excluded the use of evidence of the victim's sexual conduct,
except when the judge finds evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct should be admitted
to show the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease or when the judge finds
evidence of sexual conduct with the defendant should be admitted. Mich. Comp. Laws.
Ann. § 750.520; (Mich. Legis. Service Supp. #3, 1974, at 679-98). Iowa has provided for a
special in camera hearing on the admissibility of such evidence, and has excluded any
evidence of sexual conduct (except with the defendant) occurring more than one year prior
to the alleged crime. Ch. 1271, [19741 Iowa Laws 981. California excludes evidence of a
victim's sexual conduct with persons other than the defendant to prove consent in a rape
case, even though character evidence is otherwise admissible to show a person acted in
conformity therewith. Cal. Evid. Code § 1103 (West Supp. 1975).
99. 1 Wigmore § 9.
100. Id. § 10.
101. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-402 (Supp. 1973).
102. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-401 (Supp. 1973).
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stating the definition, the law itself does not really furnish any test
for determining relevancy and only gives guidance through precedents showing the collective wisdom of appellate judges." 0 3 It is a
question of logic and "common sense" whether any one piece of
evidence tends to make the existence of any fact in issue more or less
probable." ' Does logic or "common sense" tell us that a woman's
prior consensual sexual conduct can enlighten us on whether she
consented to what she alleged was a rape? It is perfectly obvious to
Wigmore that such is the case, and he bolsters this opinion with
quotations from jurists writing in 1846, 1856, and 1895.' ' To a
more recent author, it is perfectly obvious that such evidence is
totally irrelevant on the issue of consent in rape cases.' 0 6 It seems
clear to this writer that the latter has the better of the argument.
Recent studies have shown that over two-thirds of American women
have had premarital intercourse by the age of 25, and 81 percent of
those married before or by the age of 25 have had premarital intercourse.' 07 Thus, even though the vast majority of rape victims
appear to be under age 25,' 0 8 it is still quite probable that they have
had consensual, nonmarital sexual relations. It is difficult to see how
a factor common to the vast majority of rape victims makes it more
likely that any one of them is saying she did not consent when, in
fact, she did.
Nor does the argument for relevancy seem much more persuasive
if it is put on the ground that the woman who has had a great deal of
sexual experience is more likely to be bringing a false rape charge
than the one who has not. It is, of course, perfectly possible for a
woman with any one of the infinity of possible sexual backgrounds
to be raped. And it is equally possible for any woman to say she did
not consent, when, in fact, she did. But the little information we
have on who is raped indicates that many victims do have a "bad
reputation" at least in part because rapists seek out such women so
103. See James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 Calif. L. Rev. 689, 693-705
(1941).
104. Id. at 694. Others have attacked the concept of "legal relevancy," that is, a standard
of relevancy peculiar to the law and rising above that provided by logic and "common
sense." See McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 185, at 441 (E. Cleary, 2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCormick]; J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence
265 (1898).
105. 1 Wigmore § 62.
106. Letter from Camille E. LeGrande to California legislators, May 14, 1974, on file at
New Mexico Law Review Office, University of New Mexico Law School. (Ms. LeGrande
authored the Comment, supra note 130).
107. M. Hunt, Sexual Behavior in the 1970's 33-34 (1974).
108. Amir, supra note 14, at 52.
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their stories will not be believed.' 09 And one theory explaining why
women make false rape complaints is that they feel remorse after
having consented, so they characterize the act as rape.' 1 ° If such is
the case, it is reasonable to believe that those women with less sexual
experience would be more likely to have attacks of remorse. Thus,
there is reason to believe the inverse of the premise upon which the
admission of the victim's sexual character is based. One could as well
believe that the more sexually experienced a woman is, the more
likely it is she did not, in fact, consent. I do not intend to advance
this proposition as true, but rather to indicate that such evidence is
not relevant to the issue of consent. The kind of sexual character a
woman has sheds no light on whether she consented in any particular
situation where she claims she did not consent.
However, assuming arguendo that a woman's past sexual character
is somehow relevant to the question whether she consented to a
particular act of intercourse, it is still open to question whether such
character evidence should be the subject of one of the few exceptions to the unequivocal statement of Rule 404 that character
evidence ". . . is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he
' '
Rule
acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion."
404 provides for four exceptions, three of which are quite specific,
i.e., the character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was
the first aggressor; evidence of the character of the accused in a
criminal case; and evidence of a witness's character, which is limited
by Rule 608' 112 to character for truthfulness. The other exception,
evidence of a pertinent trait of character of a crime victim, would
seem broader than those listed above, but in practice it really only
applies to two situations. The first is that of the -prosecuting witness
in a rape case, and the second is evidence offered by the defendant in
a homicide case to show the deceased was the aggressor. Of course, if
an accused could convince a court that some other character trait
was "pertinent," then the exception would apply. But the Advisory
Committee note to the federal rule mentions only the two excep-

109. Id. at 116-19, 193.
110. See Note, Corroborating Rape Charges, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1137, 1138 (1967). The
author of the note provides a perfect example of the unverified biases of commentators that
help perpetuate the idea that there is a compelling need to protect innocent males against
scheming females in rape cases. He states, as a premise for his analysis, and without citation
of supporting authority, that many rape charges are false. Id.
111. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-404 (Supp. 1973).
112. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-608 (Supp. 1973).
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tions given above in explaining the need for the rule."' And
Wigmore finds only these two exceptions in his exhaustive work on
evidence.' I' Of the two exceptions, McCormick only mentions the
one for the character of the deceased in a homicide in his discussion
of the use of character evidence to prove conduct.' ' And finally, at
the time the rules were adopted in New Mexico, it appears that only
these two exceptions were recognized so as to give meaning to Rule
404(a)(2).' 6 So the real question becomes, What is the policy that
supports the use of character evidence to prove consent in a rape
case when the similar use of such evidence is specifically excluded in
all civil cases and in almost all criminal cases?
Wigmore gives probably the least satisfactory explanation for the
existence of this exception and at the same time illustrates the kind
of unthinking acceptance of it which has insured its perpetuation.
After explaining the policy for excluding the use of character evidence against an accused in a criminal trial, he states that the same
policy does not "affect the use of character as against other persons
in a criminal case wherever it may be relevant."' ' ' Of course, it is
only deemed "relevant" in two situations.' 18 And what is this
policy which applies only to criminal defendants? He explains the
policy of not allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of the
accused's character as follows:
This policy of the Anglo-American law is more or less due to the
inborn sporting instinct of Anglo-Normandom-the instinct of giving
the game fair play even at the expense of efficiency of procedure.' 1 9

In short, the "sporting instinct" of Anglo-Normandom is not extended to the victims in rape cases, but only to the rapists. However,
it would not be "sporting" to stop with Dean Wigmore; we should
113. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 220
(1972).
114. See 1 Wigmore § § 62-63.

115. McCormick § 193.

116. State v. Ulmer, 37 N.M. 222, 224, 20 P.2d 934, 936 (1933) (dicta); Territory v.
Lobato, 17 N.M. 666, 683, 134 P. 222, 227 (1913), affd, 242 U.S. 199 (1916). There are,
of course, other times than those listed in Rule 404 when a party's character may be subject
to proof, but these involve instances where character is an issue in the case. For example,
proof of character is relevant to the measure of damages in a slander action. Eslinger v.
Henderson, 80 N.M. 479, 457 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1969) (by implication). The discussion in
the text relates only to circumstantial use of character evidence, and not to its use when
character is an issue in the case. On the difference between character in issue and the
circumstantial use of character, see McCormick § § 187-88, and Faulknor, ExtrinsicPolicies
Affecting Admissibility, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 574, 579-85 (1956).
117. 1 Wigmore § 62 (emphasis in original).
118. See note 114 supra, and accompanying text.
119. 1 Wigmore § 57.
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examine some other opinions as to what the basis is for the discrimination against rape victims.
The Advisory Committee does not attempt to explicate its recommendation of the acceptance of the exceptions found in Rule 404.
Instead, it admits that the basis for the exceptions "lies more in
history and experience than in logic," but states that "an underlying
justification can fairly be found in terms of the relative presence and
absence of prejudice in the various situations."' ' 2 The Committee
cites as support for its contention a law review article and the 1954
edition of Professor McCormick's evidence treatise.' 21 However,
neither one of these references even mentions the use of evidence of
the alleged victim's character in a rape prosecution to prove she
consented. 1 2 2 So we see that the progenitor of New Mexico's own
Rule 404 adopted the use of evidence of a rape victim's character on
the basis of history, the nebulous "experience" of some unspecified
group,1 2 3 and two authorities that do not even mention the question.
The hearings before the House of Representatives' Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice indicate that Rule 404 was adopted for the federal courts with almost equal inattention to the question why rape
victims should be the subject of a limited exception to the usual
exclusion of character evidence. In two volumes of written and oral
testimony, 1 24 the only mention of the question is in a letter from
Edward Cleary, the Advisory Committee reporter, to the Subcommittee counsel. He explains the exceptions for rape victims and
decedents in homicide cases by saying merely that "the likelihood of
there being no impartial witness serves to emphasize the need for the
character evidence.' 2 ' This argument must be rejected as it applies
120. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 220
(1972).
121. Id.
122. The cited section of McCormick's work discusses why character evidence is not
admissible against an accused in a criminal case, except under certain circumstances. C.
McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 157 (lst ed. 1954).
The law review article, Faulknor, Extrinsic PoliciesAffecting Admissibility, 10 Rutgers L.
Rev. 574 (1956), lists the "counter-factors" which mitigate against admitting some relevant
evidence and discusses how he would balance these factors.
123. The experience of a New Mexico prosecutor indicates that special rules to uncover
fraudulent charges in rape cases are not needed because most such cases are "completely
legitimate." Rossfine, Rape, The New Mexican [Santa Fe, New Mexico], Feb. 16, 1975
(Viva Magazine), at 5.
124. Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2
(1973): Hearingson Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, Supp. (1973).
125. Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Hearings, supra note 124, at 21.
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to rape victims. Many crimes take place without impartial witnesses
being present, and the factfinder must determine whether the victim
or the defendant is giving the true account. In a homicide the victim
cannot be subjected to the usual test for truthfulness provided by a
trial and its attendant right to confrontation, so there is an unusual
need for character evidence in such cases. But rapes occur like other
crimes, sometimes with witnesses, sometimes without, and with the
trier of fact able to view both victim and defendant to test their
veracity. Professor Cleary's explanation falls far short of justifying
the rule's bias against rape victims.
In light of the difficulty in finding cogent reasons for fashioning
an exception in rape cases to the usual rule of excluding character
evidence, we should examine the reasons for usually excluding such
evidence to determine whether they apply with equal force to rape
cases. McCormick summarizes the reasons for excluding character
evidence by saying that it is not essential and that it "comes with too
much dangerous baggage of prejudice, distraction from the issues,
time consumption, and hazard of surprise."' ' 2 6 The danger of
prejudice is said to be the most compelling reason.1 2 There is no
reason to believe that proving character in rape cases would be any
less likely to raise collateral issues, consume time, 1 2 or introduce
unfair surprise in the case. But let us examine the question whether
the policy against prejudicing a party's case is of any less force in
rape cases than in others.
Prejudice, of course, does not merely mean that a party's case is
damaged, for that will always be true of evidence showing that the
facts are not as the party alleged. What is meant is "an undue
126. McCormick § 188.
127. Id. § 185, at 439; see Slough, Relevancy Unraveled-PartII-Characterand Habit
Evidence, 5 U. Kan. L. Rev. 404, 441, 443 (1957); cf State v. Alberts, 80 N.M. 472, 474,
457 P.2d 991, 993 (Ct. App. 1969). See also Udall, Character Proof in the Law of
Evidence-A Summary, 18 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 283, 297 (1949).
128. That proof of character in rape cases can consume inordinate amounts of time is
shown by the testimony of a rape victim before the California legislative committees holding
hearings on revising the California rape laws. She stated:
In my case, there was absolutely no possibility that consent was granted. He
had broken into my apartment and we had evidence of that.... However, the
Defense Attorney spent 112 hours questioning me on the stand. Of that 1/
hours, one hour was devoted to my prior sexual history -questions such as,
"Have you ever had sexual intercourse?" This question was asked, not once,
but four or five times in different words, "Was it intermittent or steady?"
They went on and on with this line of questioning.
Testimony of Teri Fredrichs in Summary of the Hearing Before the CaliforniaAssembly
Criminal Justice Committee and the California Commission on the Status of Women, Los
Angeles, Oct. 18, 1973, at 2.
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tendency to move the tribunal to decide on an improper basis."' 2 9
It is generally recognized that admitting evidence of a defendant's
bad character in any criminal case will prejudice his defense and may
1
cause the jury to convict him on the basis of his past acts. 0 There
is data to indicate that juries also tend to acquit defendants in rape
cases, not on the basis of the evidence, but because of the character
of the victim. Kalven and Zeisel, in their study of the American jury,report cases in which it appears that that is exactly what happened.' "' In one such case three men kidnapped a young woman
from the street and brutally raped her. The jury acquitted, apparently because she had two illegitimate children and the defendant
made the uncorroborated claim that she was a prostitute.' 32 The
fact of such prejudice is compounded by the immunity of the
defendant from having his character put in evidence.' ' ' The jury
must decide whether the defendant or the victim is lying, but they
are given only half the picture. Since the reasons for excluding character evidence apply just as forcefully, if not more forcefully, in rape
cases as in all the other civil and criminal cases where no exceptions
to the rule of exclusion are made, the present evidentiary rule should
be changed.
The Advisory Committee note to Federal Rule 404 suggests as
another reason for its exception to the usual exclusion of character
evidence the idea that it is "so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence
as to assume almost constitutional proportions and to override
doubts of the basic relevancy of the evidence."' " Hopefully, the
preceding discussion has adequately demonstrated that doubts about
the basic relevancy of such evidence need not humbly bow to a
jurisprudence based on dubious distinctions between rape and other
crimes and demonstrably false assumptions about sexual conduct and
jury behavior, no matter how ancient its derivation. The question
remains whether the United States Constitution requires that defendants be allowed to adduce evidence concerning the prior consensual
sexual conduct of alleged rape victims. Although the answer to this
129. McCormick § 185, at 439, n. 31. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts
and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 218 (1972).
130. See, e.g., State v. Alberts, 80 N.M. 472, 474, 457 P.2d 991, 993 (Ct. App. 1969);
McCormick § 190; 1 Wigmore § 57.
131. Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 59, at 249-54.
132. Id. at 251. Fortunately New Mexico has passed the era when the fact that the
victim was a prostitute was a defense to rape. This has not always been the case. See Ch. III,
§ 28, [1853-541 Lawsof N.M. 94.
133. State v. Alberts, 80 N.M. 472, 474, 457 P.2d 991,993 (Ct. App. 1969).
134. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 220
(1972).
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question is not free from doubt, it appears to be that the Constitution contains no such requirement.
B. Constitutionalityof Excluding CharacterEvidence
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution prohibits the
states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.' " In Pointer v. Texas' 36 the Supreme Court
held that the sixth amendment right of an accused to confront the
witnesses against him' 3' is "a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."' 38 The right to
cross-examine witnesses is a part of the right of confrontation,' 3 9
and federal and state courts must follow the same standards in
affording criminal defendants that right."'4 However, the fact that
cross-examination in a particular circumstance has long been considered a criminal defendant's prerogative does not give it the status
of a constitutional right,' "' so we must view the purpose of the rule
we are considering in relation to analogous constitutional questions
which have already been decided to determine whether it can be
altered or abandoned consistently with the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has ascribed a number of purposes to the
defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him. It is to help
"... assure the 'accuracy of the truth-determining process' ' 4 2 by

giving the defendant the chance to test the witnesses' recollection
and "sift" their consciences before the jury.' ' Cross-examination is
the accused's chance to show that a witness' testimony is motivated
by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.' " And
it is to be used to "place the witness in his proper setting and put the
weight of his testimony and credibility to a test."' s However, "the
right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in
135. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
136. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
137. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
138. 380 U.S. at 403.
139. Id. at 404.
140. Id. at 406-07. But cf Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 82 (1970).
141. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970); cf United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d
1124, 1155-56 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States v.
Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 606 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1974). See also
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 82
(1970).
142. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
143. Id.
144. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
145. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931). Accord, Smith v. Illinois, 390
U.S. 129, 132 (1968).
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appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in
the criminal trial process."' ' '6
One of the clearest limitations on the right of a defendant to
introduce evidence, either directly or through cross-examination, is
that irrelevant matter may be excluded." 4 Thus, if the argument set
out above,' 14 8 that a woman's prior sexual conduct is irrelevant to
the question whether she consented, is accepted, it should be constitutionally permissible to exclude such evidence. California, which
ordinarily admits evidence of a person's character to show that he
acted in a manner conforming to that character on a particular
occasion, has excluded such evidence on the issue of consent in rape
trials.' '9 Support for this exclusion is based on a "firm, unequivocal
denial" of the assumption that evidence of a woman's past sexual
conduct is relevant to the consent issue. 1 5 0 Other states should not
be deterred from following California's lead by the possibility of a
constitutional attack. Although the Supreme Court has expressed its
reluctance to determine what is relevant from its position as an
appellate court,' '1 it is, of course, always possible that the federal
courts, in the guise of enforcing the Constitution, will substitute
their own beliefs for those of the persons charged with formulating
the rules of evidence in the several states, and will hold that such
evidence is relevant. But hopefully the federal courts will recognize
that the cogent reasons the states have for considering sexual character evidence irrelevant on the issue of consent should not be
ignored.
But even if evidence of a woman's sexual character is not considered totally irrelevant to the issue of consent, the defendant does
not have an absolute right to inquire into it. If some questioning on
the victim's sexual history is permitted, the trial court is allowed a
great deal of discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examina-

146. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146, 151 (10th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566, 573 (lst Cir. 1974); United States v. Payseur, 501 F.2d
966, 970 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. One (1) 1972 Wood, 19 Ft. Custom Boat, FL
8443AY, 501 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Roell, 487 F.2d 395,
399-402 (8th Cir. 1973).
148. See notes 102-110 supra, and accompanying text.
149. Cal. Evid. Code § 1103 (West Calif. Legis. Service Supp. 1974).
150. Letter from Camille E. Le Grand to California legislators, May 14, 1974, on file at
New Mexico Law Review Office, University of New Mexico Law School.
151. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); N.L.R.B. v. Donnelly Garment Co.,
330 U.S. 219, 236 (1947).
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tion,' s2 and in excluding repetitious or cumulative evidence.' 3 A
conscientious use of such discretion would go far to prevent the
abuses of the right of confrontation which tend to make the rape
trial such a humiliating and traumatic experience for the victim.' 54
However, the power to limit cross-examination does not permit the
total exclusion of relevant evidence, and it comes into effect only
after there has been sufficient questioning to satisfy the sixth and
fourteenth amendments.' ss However, there are two other constitutionally permissible limitations on the introduction of even relevant
evidence which can justify the total exclusion of a rape victim's past
sexual conduct.
The first limitation is that the trial court may exclude evidence
that is relevant if it is of only slight probative value, which value is
outweighed by considerations of "undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."' s6 The United States
Supreme Court, The New Mexico Supreme Court, and the United
States Congress have all recognized the validity of this limitation by
adopting Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence,' s' which states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.' 58
A recent federal court of appeals case, United States v. Kirk, 1s9
provides an example of this limitation on the admission of relevant
evidence. The trial court refused to allow the defendant's counsel to
cross-examine one of the witnesses, a government narcotics agent, as
to whether he had threatened the defendant's family.' 60 The court
152. E.g., United States v. McKinley, 493 F.2d 547, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Jackson, 482 F.2d 1167, 1176 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1159
(1974), United States v. Phillips, 482 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Carrion, 463 F.2d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 1972).
153. E.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); United States v. DeMarco, 488
F.2d 828, 831 n. 8 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311, 318-19 (10th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
154. See note 128 supra.
155. United States v. Bass, 490 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1974).
156. United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1974).
157. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 218
(1972); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-403 (Supp. 1973); Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, art.
IV, Rule 403, 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2215, 2224.
158. Id.

159. 496 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1974).
160. Id. at 950.
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of appeals held that the refusal was within the trial judge's discretion.1 61 The evidence was probably admissible to show bias, but the
threat had allegedly occurred eight months after the surveillance
about which the witness had testified, and was collateral to the issues
in the case.' 62 Obviously the appellate court felt that the probative
value of the evidence was outweighed by its tendency to confuse the
issues and consume trial time, and thus considered its exclusion to be
constitutionally permissible.
Since the relevance of a rape victim's past sexual conduct to the
issue of consent is tenuous at best, it would appear from cases such
as Kirk and the United States Supreme Court's adoption of Rule 403
that the Constitution does not require that such evidence be admitted. However, there is another circumstance under which relevant
evidence can be excluded, and even highly relevant material is
affected. Rule 403 also provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence when its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.' 6 As noted above,' 64 evidence concerning a woman's
past sexual conduct tends to prejudice the state's case in the sense
that it has an "undue tendency to move the [jury] to decide on an
improper basis."' 65 Apparently the jury in a rape case will take such
factors as "victim precipitation" or the victim's reputation into
consideration in determining guilt, 6 6 but, of course, the past acts of
1
the accused are almost always kept from them. 67 A number of
federal court cases makes it clear that the Constitution does not
require that the defendant be allowed to interject even highly
relevant material into the trial when its potential for prejudice is as
strong as it is in rape cases.
In April 1973, narcotics agents forcefully entered a number of
1
private homes in Collinsville, Illinois in search of drugs. 68 As a
result of this incident, several narcotics agents were placed on
"limited duty" status, and were eventually indicted by a grand
161. Id.
162. Id. See United States v. Simpkins, 505 F.2d 562, 564-65 (4th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Trejo, 501 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Fernandez, 497 F.2d
730, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108, 1120 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974); Schindler v. United States, 208 F.2d 289, 296 (9th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 938 (1954).
163. See notes 157-158 supra, and accompanying text.
164. See notes 129-133 supra, and accompanying text.
165. See note 129 supra, and accompanying text.
166. Note, The Victim in a ForcibleRape Case: A Feminist View, 11 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
335, 343 (1973).
167. State v. Alberts, 80 N.M. 472, 474, 457 P.2d 991, 993 (Ct. App. 1969).
168. United States v. Kirk, 496 F.2d 947, 949 & n. 5 (8th Cir. 1974).
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69 In United States v. Kirk' 70 the trial court refused to allow
defense counsel to reveal through cross-examination the fact that the
pivotal prosecution witnesses were agents involved in the Collinsville
incident and were under investigation while on "limited duty"
status.' 71 Defense counsel wanted to bring out these matters to
show that the agents might be motivated to testify in a manner that
would ingratiate them with their superiors.' 72 Despite the fact that
the Constitution requires that extensive cross-examination be permitted if needed to show a possibility of a biased motive for testifying, ' 7 in this case the court of appeals felt the trial judge was
justified in excluding the evidence because of its highly prejudicial
nature.' 7' Even after the agents were under indictment, the same
result was reached in United States v. Quails,' 7 the court explicitly
balancing the right to reveal a possibility of biased testimony against
the need to avoid prejudicing the state's case.' 76
United States v. Wright' "' involves issues very similar to those
which would arise if evidence of a rape victim's prior sexual conduct
were excluded as too prejudicial. In Wright the robbery victim was
the only witness identifying the defendant. The defendant claimed
that the whole robbery story was fabricated because the witness had
previously seen the defendant talking to a homosexual, had "stared"
at the defendant in a way understood by both to be a homosexual
advance, and was now seeking revenge because the defendant had
ignored him.' 78 The court of appeals noted that the rejection of a
sexual advance was highly relevant because it might well give rise to
bias, but held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the evidence because its probative value was outweighed
by its potential for prejudice.' 79
A similar result was reached in Tinker v. United States,' 8 0 where
the defendant wanted to prove that the narcotics officer who
arrested him had falsely accused him because he felt pressured to
arrest someone in order to justify the riotous and debauched life he

jury.'

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
(1959).
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
496 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 949.
Id. at 950.
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496
496 F.2d at 950.
500 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1240.
489 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1186.
417 F.2d 542 (D.C. Ci. ), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 864 (1969).
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was leading as an undercover agent. 1 Part of his proof included
in homosexual activity.' 82
engaged
had
evidence that the officer
The trial court allowed him to introduce evidence that the officer
had smoked marijuana, taken cocaine, drunk liquor and engaged in
heterosexual activity,' 8 3 but drew the line at homosexual acts. The
court of appeals held that, even beyond the trial court's discretion to
limit cumulative proof, there exists the discretion to exclude evidence if it will have an adverse, prejudicial effect on the trial, as in
the case at bar.' 84
In both Wright and Tinker the courts were faced with relevant
evidence which was probative of whether the witness or the defendant was telling the truth, a crucial issue in each case. In both cases
the courts held that it was constitutionally permissible to exclude the
evidence because prejudice to the state's case would result from the
jury's being swayed by its reaction to the sexual activity of the
witness. From these cases one can conclude that evidence of the past
sexual activities of the victims can also be excluded from rape trials
because it is clear that whatever little probative value might exist is
greatly outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The Constitution does
not require that the defendant be allowed to subvert the fact-finding
process by appealing to the baser motivations of juries.' 85

CONCLUSION
The rape trial is weighted in favor of the defendant as a criminal
prosecution should be. The defendant enjoys the presumption of
innocence, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the
exclusion of his sexual history to assure he is not convicted for being
a "bad character," and the right not to testify. However, from the
victim's point of view, she, too, is on trial, and she must prove her
181. Id. at 544.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 545.
185. The duty of the trial court to exclude relevant evidence to avoid prejudice has been
recognized in a number of other cases. See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 401 F.2d 387,
389-90 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967); Hood v. United States, 365 F.2d 949, 951-52 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
Nothing said in the recent case of Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), affects the
conclusion that evidence of a rape victim's sexual character can be excluded as too
prejudicial, or having insufficient probative value. In that case the Supreme Court held that
the state's interest in preserving the anonymity of juvenile offenders must bow to a defendant's need to show a witness's possible motive for giving biased testimony when such a
showing might cause serious damage to the state's case. Id. at 319. The evidence in Davis
had great probative value, and its admission was deemed to protect the validity of the
factfinding process, not subvert it.
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innocence of what is essentially a presumption that she is bringing a
false accusation, but without the benefit of the protections afforded
her attacker. She is the "prosecutrix" who must have an inherently
probable story, tested by a review standard more stringent than in
other criminal cases.' 86 Her story must be corroborated by the
circumstances; she can be examined in public, not only on her
veracity, but on her prior sexual conduct and on any motives she
might have for bringing a false rape complaint.' 8 7 She can be sure
that she will be cross-examined in minute detail on every facet of an
extremely unpleasant experience. If it is just her word against the
defendant's, then the jury must be told that there is a good chance
that she is lying. It is no wonder that rape has such a low rate of
being reported and the lowest conviction rate for any violent crime.
By eliminating the resistance requirement and extending the
criminal sanction to all forceful deprivations of sexual choice, the
New Mexico Legislature has in part brought the law into conformance with a rational perception of sexual crimes. The judiciary
should complement this legislative action by acting in three areas.
First, any attempt to reintroduce the resistance requirement which
the Legislature has chosen to remove should be repudiated. It is a
requirement based on unrealistic expectations about the way women
should act when they are attacked, unrealistic because they require a
woman to endanger her life to serve a rejected evidentiary standard
or to cater to a sexist myth about what a woman "really" means
when she says "no."
Second, the court should change the rule that a woman's unsupported charge against a man cannot be considered "substantial
evidence" unless corroborated by surrounding circumstances. Just as
with statutory rapes of children, there is no reason to believe that
every real rape will be accompanied by resistance, outcries, or an
immediate complaint. Since the idea that juries and trial judges will
be carried away by their passions and convict on obviously false
evidence has been found to be without foundation in fact or reason,
the trial processes in rape cases should be allowed to function as in
other criminal trials. If there is really no proof sufficient to sustain a
conviction, the appellate courts can still perform their usual function
and reverse.
Finally, the victim should no longer be put on trial. Her sexual
past is not relevant to whether she consented, and rapists should not
be allowed to appeal to the self-righteous moral condemnation the
186. State v. Shouse, 57 N.M. 701, 703, 262 P.2d 984, 985 (1953).
187. State v. Cruz, 34 N.M. 507, 509, 285 P. 500 (1930).
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jury can be induced to feel by making them privy to the very private
sexual habits of rape victims, sexual habits which may well be quite
normal among young women today.
The question what kinds of limitations to put on the use of
evidence of a rape victim's past sexual conduct is a difficult one, and
has received varied responses. The New Mexico Legislature kept
essentially the same rule of admissibility as has been used in New
Mexico and placed reliance on the trial judge to protect the interests
of the state and victim by enjoining him only to admit what is
"material" and exclude that which is too "inflammatory" or "prejudicial." 1 8 Of course, if the trial court judges were doing an
adequate job of enforcing the present rule, there might not be such
an urgent need for reform, but the reports received from all sides
make it clear that judges are often not giving sufficient weight to the
legitimate needs of the state and the victims. Hopefully, the Court
will become more sensitive to the problems involved, and will take
some step beyond the cosmetic one of requiring a hearing but leaving
unchanged the standards of and responsibility for determining
admissibility.
The Michigan rule severely limits the discretion of trial judges. It
excludes all evidence of prior sexual conduct except when the trial
judge determines that it should be admitted to show the origin of
semen, pregnancy or disease, or that conduct with the defendant
should be admitted.' 8 9 It remains to be seen whether such a
sweeping exclusion will withstand constitutional attack under all
circumstances, but it cannot be denied that in Michigan the possibility of the rapist's escaping punishment by putting his victim on
trial is virtually eliminated.
The approach used in California should be immune to constitutional attack because it only eliminates the use of evidence of a
woman's past sexual conduct (except that with the defendant) to
prove consent.' 9 0 Because such evidence is deemed irrelevant, the
defendant has no right to have it admitted. The question remains
whether the trial judges will allow defense attorneys to bring in such
evidence even when its relevance to some other issue, such as motive
for falsification, is tenuous. Trial judges unwilling to administer the
new rule so as to eliminate former abuses could easily make it a
nullity.
188. Compare N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-7 (2d repl. 1972) with N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ § 20-4-401 through -403 (Supp. 1973).
189. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.520 (Mich. Legis. Service Supp. #3, 1974, at
679-98). See note 98 supra.
190. Cal. Evid. Code § 1103 (West Supp. 1975).
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The California and Michigan rules are at opposite ends of the
spectrum of possible ways to deal with the problem of eliminating
the use by a rapist of his victim's sexual character in order to escape
conviction. The Supreme Court of New Mexico should examine such
factors as the scope of the rape problem in this state, the amount of
reliance that can be placed on our trial court judges to control the
prejudicial use of evidence, and the real danger of convicting
innocent accused rapists in light of the panoply of safeguards in our
criminal law and formulate the appropriate rule.

